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Abstract 
Petrochemical plant is high risk, high parameter, high-energy plant, with the potential fire, explosion and poisoning. The intrinsic safety 
for the petrochemical plant is to use technological measures to eliminate or control risks and to prevent accidents, so that it can avoid 
damage and losses. In order to achieve the goal, the analysis contents in several sets of hydrogenation unit of HAZOP analysis reports of 
the petrochemical plant are summarized. According to it, the intrinsic safety engineering design method for the petrochemical plant is put 
forward then. Meanwhile, the database management interface is established, which realizes orderly management on the engineering safety 
design experience. Application of the method is not only easy to identify problems in design to avoid omissions and errors, but also make 
up for the lack of analysis and design experience to improve the design efficiency. It provides a guiding idea and practical method for the 
intrinsic safety design of the petrochemical plant. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Capital University of Economics 
and Business, China Academy of Safety Science and Technology. 
 
. 
Keywords: intrinsic safety; HAZOP; hydrogenation unit; safety design 
1. Introduction 
Most equipment in petrochemical plant is running with high temperature and pressure. When the operation conditions are 
interfered by some factors, the plant may be shutdown. Even it may appear fire, explosion and other accidents when it is on 
serious conditions [1]. In the design stage, if the design is conducted with the theory of intrinsic safety, such as 
simplification, substitution and minimality, the appropriate measures can be taken to control or eliminate risks in the very 
early stage. The Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a process risk analysis method, which is recognized and 
commonly used. The potential risks in the plant can be identified by application of HAZOP analysis method, and then the 
HAZOP analysis results can be utilized by the enterprise to take effective measures to eliminate or control them. However, 
there are many problems still existing in the engineering application of the current HAZOP analysis method, mainly 
including  
x Design and construction of the new plant are always carried out at the same time, which leaves little time for the HAZOP 
analysis. 
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x The design drawings are usually not the final version, and the materials analyzed by the HAZOP analysis are not 
appropriate. 
x Some persons cannot participate the whole HAZOP analysis process. 
x The potential risks identified by the HAZOP analysis may not been eliminated effectively in the near future. 
x The root reasons of some accidents cannot be acquired by the designers and producers. 
x The existing empirical knowledge cannot be inherited and shared by the engineering designers, producers, HAZOP 
analysts and other technicians [2]. 
Moreover, there are also some problems existing in the design departments, including  
x The frequent flow of trained personnel has become an obstacle restraining the development of the fresh employees. 
x The design of the plant is often influenced by the subjective factors and experience of the designers, because the 
understanding of engineering design standards varies from person to person. 
x The quantity of design auxiliary information is so huge that it is difficult to resolve the relevant problems in such a 
limited time. 
In order to solve the above problems, an intrinsic safety engineering design method for the petrochemical plant is put 
forward. Application of this method may improve the efficiency of safety design and will be important for the intrinsic 
safety production. 
 
Fig. 1. The process simulation of the plant 
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2. Traditional engineering design method 
Traditional engineering method mainly include  
x Process design and settings of important parameters 
x Process simulation of the plant 
x Calculation of monomer equipment and pipelines 
x Determination of PID of the plant 
And the hydrogenation unit design will be taken as an example to introduce the traditional engineering design method [3].  
The process simulation of the plant is shown in Fig. 1. 
3. The Intrinsic safety Design Method for the Petrochemical Plant 
The intrinsic safety design method for the petrochemical plant mainly includes 
x Risk analysis of HAZOP  
x Accumulation of experience in risk analysis, operation and emergency treatment 
x Combination of design, operation, security and relevant experience 
x Database management 
3.1. Risk Analysis of HAZOP 
In the HAZOP analysis process, the process units or equipments are taken as the nodes, and then the process (state) 
parameters of each node on normal operation conditions are taken as the standard values to analyze the deviations of the 
running process (state) parameters. All reasons for causing these deviations and the possible harmful consequences are 
analyzed. Then improvements and measures will be suggested based on the existing safeguards. On one hand, the potential 
risk factors in the primary stage of design of the plant can be identified by application of HAZOP analysis method. On the 
other hand, some suggestions and measures are provided to eliminate and control them [4-10].  
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) module interface of the major accident prevention information system (APIS) 
is shown in Fig.2, which is developed independently by the National Foundation Research Laboratory of Fault Prevention 
and Hazardous Chemicals Production System of Beijing University of Chemical Technology.  
 
Fig. 2. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) module interface of the major accident prevention information system (APIS) 
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The flow diagram of HAZOP analysis meeting and the work flow and instructions of HAZOP are mainly shown in Fig.3 
and Fig.4.   
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Node selection
According to the PID chart, the chairman of HAZOP analysis
group classifies process flow chart as different nodes, and then
develops discussion to each node.
Design purpose
The design purpose of each node is presented to HAZOP group
by process experts, and then the parameter of each node is
discussed.
Risk identification
The deviation of process parameters which is refer to normal
operation condition is analyzed and discussed. Always the start
working time and service time are put as the critical state of each
node. Risk is caused by losing security measures.
Analysis of reasons,
consequences and the
existing measures
All reasons for leading to deviation are classified and discussed,
meanwhile all possible consequences including health, safety and
environment are discussed and written. Those deviations that are
not directly relevant to safety but may have significant influence
on operation and products of the plant also need to be written.
Suggestions and notes
The typical suggestions are direct at those that are in high
probability of reasons, leading to major consequences and
without security measures, even leading to unaccepted risks and
significant operation problems. Others are suggested to add
additional information to check whether there are potential risks.  
Fig. 3. The flow diagram of HAZOP analysis meeting                  Fig.4. The work flow and instructions of HAZOP 
3.2. Accumulation of Experience in Risk Analysis, Production Operation and Emergency Treatment 
Hydro-refining reactor R2001 is the important equipment in the hydrogenation unit. In HAZOP analysis repots, 
according to the guide word, the reasons for resulting in low temperature, the possible consequences and the existing 
security measures are all listed. On the basis of analysis results, improvements and measures will be suggested. The hidden 
safe danger of the hydro-refining reactor can be identified effectively by application of the analysis results. Meanwhile, the 
corresponding measures for the engineering design in practice are provided, which significantly improve the intrinsic safety 
of the plant, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. HAZOP analysis report with design suggestions 
Equipment name: hydro-refining reactor R2001  Parameter: temperature  Guide word: low  
Reasons Consequences S L R Safeguards Suggestions Design suggestions 
1. The inlet temperature of hydro-refining 
reactor R2001 is low, or there is a failure of the 
temperature of the control valve TIC21101 of 
the mixture of hydrogen gas and oil that leads 
to low temperature. 
The effect of 
refining will be 
poor, and the 
pressure drop of bed 
will increase. These 
result in cracking 
catalyst poisoning, 
reducing working 
life, declining the 
product quality and 
then shortening the 
operating cycle. 
2 4 Low The 
temperature 
indicators of 
inlet, outlet, 
reactor bed 
and surface 
are all 
provided; 
The control 
valve of cold 
hydrogen gas 
is provided; 
SN2001; 
SN2002; 
SN2003; 
SN2010; 
SN2012 
The 
monitoring 
frequency of 
heavy metal 
should be 
increased. 
1. All the 
parameters that lead 
to high temperature 
of the reactor inlet 
should be 
determined, and  
the effect should be 
calculated by 
modifying all the 
parameters; 
2. The proportion 
of the hydrogen gas 
and oil, and the 
effect on the 
temperature of 
reactor inlet and 
bed should be 
calculated. 
2. The flux of the mixture of hydrogen gas and 
oil is large.(LHSV) 
2 2 None 
3. The partial pressure of hydrogen gas is low 
or the proportion between hydrogen gas and oil 
is high. 
2 4 Low 
4. The activity of catalyst is low. Maybe the 
stacking density of catalyst is small. Or the 
catalyst is deactivation because of heavy metal 
poisoning. 
2 4 Low 
5. The components of raw materials are heavy 
or with water. 
2 4 Low 
6. The flux control valves (TV21192, 
TV21193) of cold hydrogen gas are false 
indication, not at work or malfunction.  
2 4 Low 
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3.3. Combination of Design, Operation, Security and Relevant Experience 
In this paper, the HAZOP analysis reports of many units in the hydrogenation plant are summarized, and the equipments 
of the units are classified according to their functions in the process units. The engineering design database is established via 
software programming by application of HAZOP analysis. In this database, the HAZOP analysis and engineering design are 
combined in order to keep an orderly management on analysis and design experience. Similar process and design experience 
can be searched easily and correctly with the database. Meanwhile, it’s meaningful that the database can be updated in case 
of the missing of experience and important information.  
3.4. Database Management 
In order to guide safety engineering design and realize the intrinsic safety for the plant, visual database management 
interface is programmed, which is helpful to keep an orderly and safe management on the engineering design data of 
HAZOP analysis. Meanwhile, the data can be inputted, modified, searched and deleted to perfect the database. Then the 
information and experience which provide a theoretical guidance for analysts and designers can be shared. As shown in fig. 
5, if the "poor ammonia liquid buffer tank" is selected, the corresponding HAZOP analysis results will be shown on the 
right of the "HAZOP analysis results of hydrogenation unit". Analysts can search the design suggestions of HAZOP 
analysis with the help of the database.  
  
Fig. 5. The database management interface of the hydrogenation unit. 
4. Conclusions 
Intrinsic safety design is the primary part of the intrinsic safety of the plant. In this paper, the hydrogenation unit is taken 
as an example to put forward a hydrogenation engineering design method on the basis of the HAZOP analysis. The potential 
risks in the design stage can be eliminated or controlled by application of the suggestions of HAZOP analysis. On one hand, 
it makes up for the lack of analysis and design experience to improve the design efficiency. On the other hand, the contents 
of HAZOP analysis reports and the experience of engineering design are combined to be stored into the database to keep a 
safe and orderly management, which also plays a significant role in the intrinsic safety of the plant. Meanwhile, the 
knowledge of safety design experience can also provide the basis for HAZOP analysis to perfect HAZOP analysis reports. 
In summary, on the basis of HAZOP analysis, it provides a way to reduce the renovation cost and improve the safety level 
of the petrochemical plant by the application of engineering design method. 
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